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Abstract
This thesis provides a complete design and implementation of audit trail collection and
storage for Aeolus, a distributed security platform based on information flow control.
An information flow control system regulates all activities that concern information
security. By recording all the operations monitored by Aeolus, our audit trails capture
all actions that can affect system security. In our system, event records are collected
on each system node and shipped to a centralized location, where they are stored and
processed. To correlate audit trail events of different system nodes we store event
dependencies directly in the event records. Each audit trail record keeps links to
its immediate predecessors. Therefore, our audit trails form dependency graphs that
capture the causal relationship among system events. These graphs can be used to
reconstruct the chains of events leading to a given system state. Our results show
that audit trail collection imposes a small overhead on system performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to add audit trails to Aeolus, a distributed security
platform based on information flow control. Aeolus is designed to facilitate the de-
velopment of secure applications that protect confidential information entrusted to
them.
However, even applications implemented in Aeolus can contain errors that lead to
violations of security, and furthermore, malicious attacks can cause applications to
misbehave. Therefore, it is also important to evaluate what the system does in order
to determine whether it is behaving as expected, and if not, to discover what led up
to the problem.
Monitoring events that occur in a given system can be achieved through the
use of audit trails. Audit trails can be used to detect security violations, diagnose
performance problems, and discover programming errors. In this project, we focus
primarily on the goal of detecting security violations and assume that the system is
operating correctly and performs adequately under normal workload.
Support for auditing requires both collecting the data and providing means to
analyze it. This work is primarily concerned with the former. We provide a complete
design and implementation for collecting and storing audit trails for applications
that run on the Aeolus platform. In addition, we provide tools for examining and
displaying the collected information.
1.1 Related Work
This section discusses the relationship of our work to previous research in the area of
secure audit trails.
Our approach follows many common practices established by earlier work. For ex-
ample, we define a format for our event records that includes standard event informa-
tion, such as the type of the event, its approximate date and time, and success/failure
status [19, 5].
However, our project differs from prior work in a number of ways. First, to the
best of our knowledge ours is the first system that does auditing for a platform based
on information flow control instead of access control. Information flow control is a
reliable way to protect information because it can allow access to the data without
also allowing its release. For example, an administrator in a medical system may
need to examine patient records, e.g., to set up appointments. With access control,
allowing an individual to use information also allows him to release it, e.g., attach it
to an email. An information flow control system separates these activities, avoiding
information leaks.
A system based on information flow control provides a useful way of determining
what events need to be included in the audit trails. In particular, an information flow
control system regulates all activities that concern information security. This means
that to get a complete audit trail of actions that affect system security, it is sufficient
to capture all the operations that are monitored by the system; this is the approach
we take in auditing Aeolus.
In this project we focus on auditing in a distributed system. Although auditing
has been an active area of research for many years, much of the earlier work deals
with stand-alone single-processor machines [14, 18]. Auditing in a distributed set-
ting, which includes multiple processors operating asynchronously, introduces several
additional concerns [17]. One problem is to determine where and how to collect the
logs efficiently. We address this question by following a common audit trail collection
pattern; namely, we collect the logs locally on each node and then ship them to a
central location for storage and processing [2].
A much more fundamental problem is how to correlate events recorded on different
nodes of the system. On a single processor, events can be ordered using the machine
clock. However, this approach does not work in a multi-processor environment. Al-
though extensive work has been done on distributing a standard time among system
nodes (e.g. NTP [12]), the clocks cannot be synchronized precisely. Nevertheless
many distributed systems rely on the availability of accurate timestamps for event
ordering; a discussion on this topic can be found in [15].
Lamport logical clocks [10] can be used to get a "happened-before" ordering with
minimal overhead. These clocks guarantee that if an event happened before another
event, then its logical clock value will be smaller than that of the second event.
However, the converse is not necessarily true, i.e., if the clock value of an event is
smaller than that of a second event, it is not necessarily the case that this event
happened before the second event. Therefore, the total ordering provided by the
Lamport clocks is one of many possible total orderings of the system events.
In general, ordering events based on time (i.e. the "happened-before" relationship)
cannot be relied on to imply a causal relationship since it does not provide information
about how the events actually depend on each other, i.e. about what events could
have causally affected others. Vector timestamps [8] derived from Lamport clocks
provide a way to capture this information; however, they are not scalable and will
cause significant overhead if used in a large distributed system.
In this work we explicitly correlate audit trail records so that we can reconstruct
all the dependencies among the recorded events. This is achieved by uniquely iden-
tifying each recorded event in the system and storing event dependencies directly
in the audit trail. Each audit trail record stores links to its immediate predecessor
events. Therefore, our audit trails form dependency graphs, where the nodes are the
individual system execution events and the edges represent the causal relationships
captured by the predecessor links. From this information, we can easily reconstruct
event chains by following the event predecessor links. For example, we can find all
the events that could have led to an invalid system state.
Recent work on backtracking intrusions [9] presents dependency graphs constructed
by recording system calls that induce dependency relationships between OS-level ob-
jects (e.g. creating a process, reading and writing files). These graphs differ from the
ones generated by our audit trails since their nodes represent the individual system
objects (e.g. files and processes) and the edges represent system calls that involves
these objects (e.g. a process executing a file). In our system, as explained above,
the nodes are the events recorded during system execution (e.g. file read, I/O device
write) and the edges capture their causal relationship (e.g. a file read affects the
subsequent write of a different file).
There is a large body of work on audit trail discovery, e.g. intrusion detection. A
survey of this work can be found in [11, 15]. This work is concerned with discovering
anomalous user behavior, for example, using statistical analysis or attack signature-
detection [20, 22, 21, 13]. Although our project is primarily concerned with audit
trail collection, we need to ensure that our audit trails capture all the information
necessary to enable a useful audit trail analysis. Prior work introduced the concept
of goal oriented logging [3, 2]. This is the idea that the goals of the auditing process
should determine what information is logged. Bishop et al. [3] propose deriving audit
trail content requirements from the security policy of the system that partitions all
system states into secure and non-secure. The content of an audit trail then needs to
monitor all the events that can lead from a secure to a non-secure system state.
Our audit trails monitor events at the level of the user application interaction with
the Aeolus security platform. Logging at the interface to the Aeolus platform allows
us to capture all the security-sensitive system activity. As mentioned earlier, this is
because any operation that uses or affects information flow, which is at the basis of
our security model, is mediated by the Aeolus platform. In addition, we also provide
an interface to our auditing subsystem that can be used to capture application-level
events.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the relevant
background on the Aeolus security platform and its implementation. In Chapter 3
we discuss how we reconstruct the history of program executions using Aeolus audit
trails. Chapter 4 describes the format of audit trail records and what kind of infor-
mation they capture. In Chapter 5 we provide specific information about the events
stored in the audit trail. Chapter 6 describes the implementation techniques used to
build the audit trail collection framework and Chapter 7 presents several examples
of how audit trail data can be used to monitor and evaluate system activity. Chap-
ter 8 evaluates the audit trail overhead on the performance of the system. Finally,
Chapter 9 concludes and discusses future work for this project. Appendix A provides
a complete summary of all the events recorded in the audit trails and Appendix B
includes a detailed description of the data structures used to collect and ship audit
trail data in our current prototype.
Chapter 2
Aeolus Platform
A complete description of the Aeolus platform can be found in Cheng[6]. In this
chapter we briefly present some relevant Aeolus background information. We begin
by describing the high-level platform architecture in Section 2.1 and then introduce
several key implementation concepts in Section 2.2. Any major differences between
the current platform implementation and the work presented in [6] will be discussed
in the appropriate sections of this thesis.
2.1 Aeolus Architecture
Aeolus is a distributed security platform based on information flow control: it tracks
information as it flows through programs and determines whether programs have the
authority to perform certain security-sensitive operations. Figure 2-1 shows the high-
level architecture of the platform. This figure shows the Aeolus platform running on
a collection of nodes divided into two categories: compute nodes and storage nodes.
Compute nodes are intended to run user application code and storage nodes are
used to persistently store sensitive user data (note: a node can be both a compute
and a storage node). Aeolus also includes a logically centralized shared authority
state (AS). Aeolus nodes consult the authority state in order to determine whether
privileged operations should be allowed. Communication can occur among Aeolus
system nodes, as well as with outside nodes and I/O devices, which are not trusted.
Compute Nodes Storage Nodes Authority State
User User
Data Data
Aeolus Aeolus Aeolus
A 0- Of
Figure 2-1: Aeolus Distributed Security Platform
More details about the Aeolus platform architecture can be found in Chapter 2 of [6].
2.2 Aeolus Platform Implementation
As shown in Figure 2-2, each compute node runs a set of platform instances (PIs).
Within each platform instance there is an Aeolus system process, which has access
to all system resources, and many user threads managed by the Aeolus process. User
threads make calls to the Aeolus process to get access to various system resources
(e.g. the file system and I/O devices). User code is executed in the user threads. It
interacts with the Aeolus platform through a set of methods exposed by the Aeolus
User API. Chapter 3 of [6] contains a detailed description of all the provided methods.
Each platform instance also has an audit trail collector object that is responsible for
collecting and shipping audit trail events from all the user threads in the platform
instance and a shared state manager that provides user access to shared memory.
In order to allow RPCs among Aeolus nodes, each node maintains a registry of
services provided by platform instances at that node. In addition, each node also
includes an authority state client that manages interactions with the authority state
server and file system clients that manage interactions with the corresponding storage
nodes.
Figure 2-2: Aeolus Compute Node Structure
.............
Chapter 3
Event Graphs
The purpose of an audit trail is to enable the reconstruction of the history of a
system execution. As a system runs, we need to capture "events" that represent
what it is doing. Furthermore, to reconstruct the chain of events leading to a given
system state, we need to correlate the events in the system - we need to order them,
recognizing any dependencies between them. Since Aeolus is a distributed system,
we cannot rely on system timestamps as a means for ordering the events due to the
possible lack of synchronization among machine clocks. One possibility would be
to use vector timestamps [8]; however, these are not scalable and would result in a
significant overhead.
Audit trails in our system are represented as event graphs, where each event
records some action that occurred as the system ran. We capture dependencies be-
tween events by storing them directly. Each audit trail event stores links to the events
that immediately preceded it. Following these predecessor links, we can reconstruct
a partial event order and thus correlate certain events in the log. More specifically,
given an event in the log, E, we define Pred(E) to be the set of events that are
immediate predecessors of E (we describe what these predecessors are in Chapter 5).
Iteratively applying the predecessor relation starting with E:
E -> Pred(E) -- Pred(Pred(E)) -.
we can order all the events that E depends on and thus find, by transitivity, all the
A D G X
F Y
C E)Z
Figure 3-1: Event Dependency Graph. Predecessors of event E are highlighted in
yellow; direct predecessors are contoured in red.
events that could have caused E.
In other words, audit trail event entries together with their predecessor links form
an event dependency graph of all the events recorded during the run of an application.
These event dependency graphs are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) where the nodes
represent the recorded events and the edges denote the event predecessor relationship
(i.e. there will be an edge A --> B in the graph if node A is the direct predecessor
of node B, that is, the set Pred(B) includes A). Therefore, a given event P is a
predecessor of another event E if there is a path from node P to E in the event
dependency graph and so all the events that could have caused E are the nodes in
the graph that have a path to E. These graphs have no cycles due to the temporal
nature of the predecessor relation: if an event A is a predecessor of an event B, then
it must have occurred prior to B (note: there are no self-edges in these graphs since
an event cannot be its own predecessor). In order for a cycle to occur, there needs
to be some event C such that B is a predecessor to C and C is a predecessor to
A; however, if B is a predecessor to C, then C must have occurred after B and, by
transitivity, after A and so it cannot be a predecessor to A.
Figure 3-1 shows a sample event dependency graph. The direct predecessors of
E are the events F and H (i.e. Pred(E) = {F, H}). Events A, D, and G are also
E's predecessors since there is a path from these events to E (Pred(Pred(E))
{A, D, G}).
- ---------------- # .......
It is important to note that predecessor links do not provide us with a total or-
dering of all the events in the system and only allow us to order events that somehow
depend on each other. Concurrent events will be part of separate predecessor de-
pendency chains and cannot be correlated. For example, in Figure 3-1 we cannot
correlate the chain of events X --+ Y -* Z with any other events in the graph. How-
ever, since each event entry in the log includes an approximate timestamp, we will be
able to recognize the order of events occurring at sufficiently different times.
Chapter 4
Audit Trail Content
An Aeolus audit trail is an event log that monitors user code interaction with the
Aeolus platform; more specifically, it records the invocation of every method exposed
by the Aeolus User API. Each use of the Aeolus platform corresponds to one or more
event records in the log. By logging at the level of the Aeolus interface, we guarantee
that we can capture all security-sensitive operations. We also provide an interface to
the auditing subsystem that can be used to capture additional events. This interface
can be used by an application to record events that correspond to application level
activities. The Aeolus audit trail could also include events that correspond to internal
Aeolus platform actions. These events would be useful in debugging the platform
code; however, we do not investigate this use in this work.
We begin in Section 4.1 by describing the format and content of the recorded
events. Section 4.2 provides more details about what are the predecessors of an event
and introduces the terminology used to refer to them throughout the thesis. Finally,
Section 4.3 describes the operational interface to the auditing layer that can be used
to record additional application level events. Chapter 5 describes what events are
placed in the log for all the operations that make up the interface to Aeolus.
4.1 Event Record Format
An audit trail event record has the following format:
<eid, preds, method-name, parms, status, ret-val, timestamp>.
We now briefly describe each included field.
Event ID (eid)
Each event record is associated with a globally unique event ID. This ID is used to
refer to a particular event from other event records.
Event Predecessors (preds)
Event predecessors are a set of event IDs that correspond to events considered to
have immediately preceded the given event; that is, events upon which the given
event depends directly. We store the IDs of the predecessors to allow us to correlate
and order the event entries in the log. Since each event has a globally unique ID,
the stored predecessor IDs will always resolve to the appropriate events. Section 4.2
describes how the predecessors are determined.
Method Name (method-name)
The method name identifies the type of the recorded event (e.g. a file read or a
principal creation).
Parameters (parms)
The parameters are the user-supplied arguments to the methods of the Aeolus API
that are relevant to Aeolus (e.g. the name of the file a user is trying to read or
the labels for a shared state object to be created). We do not log application level
user-supplied arguments, such as arguments to remote procedure calls, or the data
being written to a file or to a shared state object. This information can be recorded
at the application level using the interface for application level logging. Storing
event parameters allows us to filter on events involving arguments of interest; for
example, we might want to track all the delegations of a given tag or find all the
failed attempts to release a sensitive file. Although the current prototype does not
support backtracking, user-supplied parameters can help support this functionality
in future work.
Status (status)
The status denotes the event outcome: whether it succeeded or failed. An operation
can fail in an expected way due to an illegal argument or non-deterministically due
to an unpredictable cause, such as a system network or I/O exception. Although
we assume the system is operating correctly (and hence will not generate exceptions
due to system code bugs), we would not be able to tell whether an operation actually
succeeded (and hence induced some changes to the state of the system) due to possible
unpredictable failures associated with many Aeolus operations. For example, we can
predict any failures due to information flow constraints or access of non-existent files
or shared state objects; however, we cannot predict a network failure during an RPC
or authority client communication with the authority server. Although it might be
useful to diagnose certain problems, we do not explicitly specify the cause of an
operation failure since it is not needed to satisfy our primary security goal specified
above.
Return Value (ret-val)
The return value of an event is an Aeolus-related result generated by the operation.
As with parameters, we do not log application-level information, such as the data
returned from a file read. The return value can be useful for event log filtering; for
example, we might be interested in the creation event of a given principal, tag, or
shared state object - this event can be found by matching the return value with the
given object ID.
Timestamp (timestamp)
The timestamp provides an approximate time at which the event occurred. Although
local system timestamps cannot be used to order events in a distributed system, they
can be useful for filtering audit trail data; for example, they can be used to answer
questions about what was happening in the system approximately before, at, or after
some given time of the day.
4.2 Event Predecessors
Most events are recorded during the execution of a user application. These events
always have at least one direct predecessor event, which is the event that immediately
preceded them in the same user thread, referred to as P-PRED. More specifically, this
event is the latest interaction with the Aeolus platform of the same user computation.
The P-PRED links provide a way to order all the events in a given user process.
If there were no communication between user processes, P-PRED links would be
sufficient to capture most of the user event dependencies. However, Aeolus provides
several mechanisms for inter-process communication: user processes can communicate
via the shared state, the file system, remote procedure calls, and, implicitly, through
the authority state. Any point of communication between two separate processes
creates a dependency between the events in these processes. For example, if a process
A writes to a file and another process B later reads from this file observing what A
wrote, then all the events in B starting with the file read depend on A's file write
event; therefore, the file write event serves as a predecessor to the file read and, by
transitivity, to all the subsequent events of B. For this reason, audit trail entries
corresponding to communication events usually store a second predecessor, C-PRED,
that may represent an event in a different user process.
To summarize, an event can generally have two predecessors: P-PRED and C-
PRED. P-PRED is the event that immediately preceded the given operation in the
same user process and C-PRED is an event of a possibly different user process that
also logically precedes the given operation due to some form of inter-process commu-
nication.
The mechanism of determining and assigning C-PREDs is different for each com-
munication mechanism. Chapter 5 describes the mechanisms that Aeolus provides
for inter-process communication and what the logical C-PREDs are for each type of
their explicit or implicit communication events.
4.3 Auditing User Interface
Although Aeolus records all security-sensitive operations executed by the user appli-
cation code, developers might be interested in including additional events into the
audit trails. We provide a simple interface to our auditing subsystem, which allows
adding application level information to Aeolus audit trails. This interface is an ex-
tension to the Aeolus User API.
In order to add an event to the audit trail, applications can use the CreateEvent
operation. This operation creates and stores a new event in the audit trail and returns
the ID of this event. This operation is treated like any other invocation of the Aeolus
User API and the new event is correlated accordingly with other events in the same
user process; namely, its P-PRED is set to the previous invocation of an Aeolus API
method by the same user thread. Applications can use the returned event IDs to
correlate their events; namely, they can specify them as predecessors when creating
other events. The created event has the same format as all other platform level events;
the arguments to the operation correspond to the fields described in Section 4.1.
Creating a new event :
e eid createEvent(preds, method-name, parms, status, ret-val,
timestamp): Creates a new event in the audit trail and returns its event ID.
The method name must be specified as a string; the parameters and the re-
turn value must be serializable objects, so that they can be persistently stored
and retrieved. This event automatically has the previous event of the calling
thread as its P-PRED; additional predecessors can be specified using the preds
argument.
Chapter 5
Audit Trail Events
This chapter describes in more detail what event records are included in the audit
trail for each type of user code interaction with the Aeolus platform. Each section
begins with a brief description of the mechanism involved and then discusses the
audit trail content it generates. A summary of events associated with each Aeolus
operation can be found in Appendix A.
5.1 Authority State
We differentiate between two types of authority events: updates and lookups. Author-
ity updates (e.g. authority delegations or revocations) are processed at the authority
server, while authority lookups (e.g. checks if a principal has authority for a given
tag or can switch to another principal) are answered by the local authority client of
each Aeolus node.
Although the authority state is not a mechanism for direct user process commu-
nication, authority events from one user process can influence the result of authority
events that follow them in a different user process and can logically serve as their
predecessors. For example, if principal A delegates authority for tag T to a different
principal B and the event of checking B's authority for tag T during a declassify
succeeds, then the authority delegation event is a logical predecessor of the success-
ful authority check event (assuming B did not already have authority for T from
somewhere else).
5.1.1 Authority Updates
Authority updates can be issued concurrently by different user processes and are
serialized at the authority server, which propagates these updates to authority clients.
Each update operation corresponds to three events in the audit trail. Two events are
logged at the client node. These correspond to the authority update request and
reply, respectively. When the authority server receives the update request it logs an
additional event that represents the update operation at the server. The C-PRED
of this event is the authority update request from the client and its P-PRED is the
update event that was serialized immediately before it at the server. The update
event at the authority server is the C-PRED of the update reply event at the client;
the P-PRED of the reply event is the update request. Figure 5-1 shows the correlation
of the events at the authority server and two authority clients.
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Figure 5-1: Authority Updates Correlation
5.1.2 Authority Lookups
An authority lookup operation corresponds to one event in the audit trail. Authority
lookups are processed at the authority client, which caches authority state and may
not be up to date with the authority server. The C-PRED of these events is the latest
authority update event seen by their authority client - i.e. the latest authority update
reflected in the answer from the authority client.
5.2 Node Creation and Deletion
Once the authority state is running, nodes can be added to the Aeolus system. The
creation of an Aeolus node takes place in several steps. First the node is registered
with the authority state. As part of node registration, the authority state creates a
root principal ID for this node (the first platform instance on that node will run on
behalf of this principal ID). After registration, various node components are initialized
(for example, the file system manager (if this is a storage node), and the logging client;
the node also keeps structures to track platform instances it has launched and the
services they provide. Finally, the first platform instance is created on this node
to run the start-up application code. When the node is launched, a node creation
event is logged. This event record stores information about the node, such as the
node's hostname and root principal ID. This event has no P-PRED since it is the first
system event on this machine; however, it has a C-PRED event returned as part of the
authority state registration reply, representing the registration event at the authority
server. After the node creation event, two more events are recorded. First an event is
created to represent the launch of the start-up PI. This event has the node creation
event as its predecessor; the platform instance launch events are described in more
detail in the next section. The second event is the launch of the first user thread in
the start-up PI, which has the platform instance launch event as its predecessor and
stores the principal ID that the thread runs on behalf of.
A node can also be deleted from the Aeolus system. Upon node deleted, the
authority state is notified to remove the node from the system. Two events are
created for this operation in the user thread requesting the deletion: the request
event, which includes the information about the node (i.e. node hostname), and the
reply event. An event is also recorded at the authority state server to represent the
deletion at the server.
5.3 Platform Instance Launch and Shutdown
As mentioned in Section 5.2, when a node starts up, Aeolus launches the start-up
platform instance. In addition, Aeolus provides a mechanism to launch other platform
instances locally and remotely. When a platform instance is created, it is associated
with a principal ID (the start-up platform instance of each node runs on behalf of
the node root principal). Application developers can specify what principal to launch
a platform instance with, as long as information flow rules are obeyed (namely, the
caller has null labels and has the authority to act on behalf of the specified principal).
The caller also specifies what application to run in this platform instance and any
application arguments (the application is specified as the full path name to its class).
This code starts running in a user thread of this platform instance.
The launch of a platform instance caused by a call in a user thread corresponds to
five event records in the audit trails. The first event is the PI launch request, which
includes the parameters discussed above, such as the platform instance's principal ID
and the application name (the arguments to the application are not included). This
event has only one predecessor; namely, its P-PRED. The second event is logged when
the new platform instance is created at the appropriate Aeolus node. This event has
as its P-PRED the node creation event and as its C-PRED the PI launch request
event; it also stores the the platform instance's principal ID and the application
name. The next event is logged when the first user thread of this platform instance is
launched to run the specified application. After this application thread finishes, the
return from the PI launch event is created. The P-PRED of the return event is the
latest invocation of an Aeolus API method in the user application thread. This event
becomes the C-PRED of the final event recorded for this operation. This last event
is created in the thread that issued the launch request and represents the PI launch
reply.
In the case of the start-up platform instance launch only three events are recorded.
These events are the events described above excluding the request and reply events
of the caller user thread.
Figure 5-2 shows the correlation of the platform instance launch events. The
events recorded during the start-up platform instance launch are the three events at
the server side; the figure also shows the node creation event that triggers the start-up
platform instance launch.
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Figure 5-2: Platform Instance Launch Events Correlation
We are interested in knowing what code is being executed at this platform instance.
To monitor this, we log the hash value of the loaded application class (this is achieved
by extending the default Java ClassLoader to compute the MD5 hash function of all
the classes it loads).
A platform instance can also be shut down locally or remotely. This operation
corresponds to four events: the shutdown request and reply in the caller user thread
and two events for the shutdown at the appropriate node. When shutting down, the
platform instance terminates all its user threads and unregisters its services from the
node registry. It also ships any remaining event records to the centralized collector
(see Chapter 6 for more details about the audit trail collection framework).
5.4 Service Registration
In order to enable communication between system nodes, each node has a registry of
services it hosts. A user thread in a PI can register a service with Aeolus that will
be handled by that PI and a user thread on a different node can invoke a method on
this service (via the RPC mechanism described below). When registering a service,
the name of the service and the name of the implementing class are specified. The
service registration corresponds to one event in the audit trail. This event stores the
name of the service being registered.
5.5 Remote Procedure Calls
Users can invoke methods on remote services registered with Aeolus by retrieving a
service proxy from Aeolus at the client side - this proxy serves as a local reference to
the remote service object. A method invocation on this proxy triggers Aeolus to send
an RPC request from the client node to the node hosting the service. This request
carries some Aeolus specific information necessary to start the processing of the RPC
request at the server (such as the caller's process labels), as well as information about
the invoked service, method, and the user-supplied parameters to the remote method
call. When the server receives an RPC request it forwards it to the PI that handles
that service; the PI then starts a new user thread with the specified information flow
state running the specified service method (this thread runs on behalf of the platform
instance principal). When this new thread finishes, it sends back an RPC reply to
the client carrying the result of the computation and its process labels in order to
propagate any contamination back to the caller.
RPCs cause four events to be added to the audit trail: two events at the client side
(send-RPC and receive-RPC-reply) and two events at the server side (receive-RPC
and send-RP C-reply). We correlate the events at the client and the server side, such
that the first event that occurs at the server side as a result of the RPC request has as
its C-PRED the client's send-RPC event and the first event that occurs at the client
after receiving the RPC reply has as its C-PRED the last server-side event recorded
during the remote method invocation. This is achieved by carrying predecessor event
IDs via the RPC request and reply. Furthermore, the node service registry serves
as an indirect communication point for service registration and invocation events.
More specifically, if upon the receipt of an RPC request at a given Aeolus node, the
requested service is found on that node, then we know that the service registration
event is a predecessor to the subsequent events generated by this RPC's receipt.
Therefore, a predecessor of the receive-RPC event is the registration event of the
service whose method is being invoked.
Figure 5-3 shows the correlation of the client and server side events, as well as
the service registration and access events, which is achieved through the platform
instance service registry.
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Figure 5-3: Remote Procedure Call Events Correlation
5.5.1 Client-Side
Before a user thread can make remote procedure calls it needs to get the service
proxy from Aeolus. This operation corresponds to one event in the audit trail that
specifies the name of the obtained service. Each remote method invocation on a
service corresponds to two events at the client side. The first event is the send-RPC
request, which is generated when a method is invoked on the local service proxy. This
event stores information about the service and the remote method being invoked (the
parameters to the remote method are not recorded). The second event is registered
upon the receipt of the RPC reply. This event has two predecessors. Its P-PRED is
the send-RPC request event and its C-PRED is the last server event.
5.5.2 Server-Side
Similar to the client side events, two events are recorded at the server side for each
received RPC request. After a new user thread starts processing the RPC request,
the first event in this new thread is the receipt of the RPC request. This event has two
predecessors: the send-RPC request event at the client and the registration event of
the service being invoked. When the method invocation returns, the send-RPC-reply
event is generated, which becomes the predecessor of the receive-RPC-reply event at
the client. The P-PRED of this event is the latest event generated by the remote
method or, if no events were recorded during the remote method execution, it is the
receipt of the RPC request event.
5.6 Local Calls and Forks
Users can make a local call with a different principal by invoking the Aeolus Call
operation, which runs the user-supplied code object with the desired principal ID in
the same user thread. Two events are recorded for this operation: one for the call and
one for the return from the call. The call event stores the principal ID that the call
runs with; it does not store the actual code. Both events only have one predecessor.
The event record for the return event has as its P-PRED the latest event recorded
during the execution of the supplied code object.
Users can also fork a new user thread by supplying the code and principal for this
thread. An Aeolus Fork operation corresponds to two events: a fork request event
recorded in the parent thread and the launch of the new user thread event recorded
in the child thread. The fork request event is the predecessor of the new user thread
launch event. As with the Call operation, the fork request stores the principal of the
child thread but does not store the code object being run in that thread.
5.7 Local Authority Closures
Authority closures provide the ability to grant authority directly to code. Users can
create authority closures by specifying the full class name of the desired closure to
the CreateClosure operation. This operation corresponds to one event in the audit
trails. A closure creation call is an authority update event and therefore has two
predecessors (its C-PRED is the latest authority update event at the server). It
stores as a parameter the class name of the closure. It also stores the closure ID as
its return value.
To run a closure, users need to get an instance of the given closure type by
providing the appropriate closure ID to the GetClosure method. This operation also
corresponds to one event in the trail. A call to the authority client is made to get the
information associated with the given closure ID; this is an authority lookup event
and, therefore, this event also has two predecessors (as described in Section 5.1).
Finally, the closure object can be invoked using the CallClosure method. This
operation executes the closure code inside the same user thread with the authority
associated with the closure ID. This is similar to the local call operation. Two events
are logged: one for the call and one for the return from the closure.
5.8 Boxes
Boxes encapsulate sensitive data, allowing it to be passed around without contami-
nating the process unless the box content is accessed. Users can create an AeolusBox
object by setting its inner and outer labels. Content can be read and written to the
box based on the inner labels. A process can also retrieve the inner and outer labels
of the box if the box outer labels permit. Each box operation corresponds to one
event record. Since users can share data using the box content, the C-PRED of a box
content read or write operation is the event that last updated the box content (or
the box creation event, if no content has been written to the box). In this way, we
can know what information was observed by a given box content read event and we
can capture the order of box content write events. The C-PRED of the inner or outer
label retrieval is the box creation event.
5.9 Shared State
The shared state provides a way for user processes of the same platform instance to
exchange information and synchronize. There are three ways of communicating via
the shared state - through the use of shared objects, shared queues, and shared locks.
Each shared state operation corresponds to one event in the audit trail.
5.9.1 Shared Objects
Shared objects allow for content to be stored and retrieved from the shared state by
different user processes. Users can create a shared object, read its content, update
its content, and delete the object. Each operation (except create) has as its C-PRED
the event that last updated the content of this shared object. Therefore, a write to a
shared state object is a predecessor to any subsequent reads and the subsequent write
or delete of this object. The create event is treated as a first write of the object.
5.9.2 Shared Queues
Shared queues provide messaging capabilities to user threads by allowing them to
enqueue and dequeue items. Information can be shared via the objects enqueued in
the shared queue and also via the order in which the objects were enqueued. When
a process dequeues an item from the queue, it gets access to the content provided
by a potentially different process; therefore, the C-PRED of each successful dequeue
operation is the enqueue event of the dequeued item. To maintain the order of the
enqueue and dequeue operations, the C-PRED of an enqueue event is the event that
last modified the queue (i.e. the latest enqueue or dequeue event). The queue creation
is the C-PRED of the first enqueue event.
5.9.3 Shared Locks
Shared locks are provided to allow for user process synchronization. Users can create
a shared lock and execute lock, unlock, and trylock operations on it. These opera-
tions are also considered process communication events although they don't directly
share any data. The C-PRED is maintained such that the chain of lock and unlock
operations on a shared lock can be reconstructed. More specifically, a lock (or suc-
cessful trylock) operation will be a predecessor of the unlock operation and the unlock
operation will be a predecessor to the subsequent successful lock or trylock.
5.9.4 Deleted Objects
A problem arises with setting the C-PRED of events accessing shared state objects
that have been deleted. Ideally, we would like to set the C-PRED of such an event
to be the object's deletion event; however, this would require us to keep the deleted
objects in the shared state forever. We do not store these objects and instead fill in the
record's C-PRED field in the post-collection processing step by finding the deletion
event for the appropriate object and setting the C-PRED field to that event's ID. Since
multiple delete operations could have been issued for the same object concurrently, we
are interested in the delete operation that actually succeeded, which will be captured
by the event's status field. If the delete event is not found because the deletion event
occurred a long time ago and has been archived, this field will remain blank.
5.10 File System
In the Aeolus distributed platform, sensitive user data can be stored persistently on
designated storage nodes. Each storage node runs an Aeolus FS manager, which is
responsible for servicing file system requests on data stored in the node's underlying
file system. Each Aeolus file and directory is associated with an immutable secrecy
and integrity label, specified at creation time. Before data can be read from or written
to a file or directory, Aeolus FS checks these labels and ensures that the requesting
user process is authorized to perform these operations. In the current implementation,
the label information is stored in a separate hidden metadata file (co-located with
the data file).
Users can communicate with specific storage nodes by invoking corresponding file
system methods of the Aeolus API and passing the hostname of the desired storage
node as an argument to these calls. When a request is submitted for a given storage
node for the first time at a compute node, a new Aeolus FS client is created to
communicate with the Aeolus FS manager running on the specified node (there will
be one client running on a given Aeolus node for each storage node that a user
process on that node has communicated with). The Aeolus FS client submits file
system requests to its Aeolus FS manager. To improve performance, the Aeolus FS
client caches the information received from the manager. The client cache stores file
content and labels based on the file pathname. If the data for a file is present in the
cache upon a file read operation, the client checks the file labels and returns the data
from the cache if the read is permitted. All file writes and directory updates (i.e. file
and directory creations and deletions) are forwarded to the server. To ensure causal
consistency, the server invalidates files in client caches by piggybacking a list of file
names that have been modified in each client reply (the server also sends periodic
invalidations to the clients). File stream operations are treated as block reads and
writes; more specifically, when a file stream is open for reading, the entire file content
is fetched to the client and writes to a file stream are accumulated locally and only
sent to the server when the file stream is closed (as one file write).
We need to capture dependencies between events of different user threads that
communicate by observing and updating data stored in the file system. More specifi-
cally, we want to set the C-PRED of each file read and write event to be the event that
corresponds to the write operation that they observe (we treat directory content list-
ing and file creations and deletions as reads and writes to the directory, respectively).
Therefore, we would like to know the latest write event of each file or directory. One
possibility would be to keep this information in the metadata file that currently just
stores the labels (this is similar to the shared state approach); however, this solution
would require an additional write of the metadata file per each data file write opera-
tion (each file write would need to update the metadata file to reflect the latest write
event). To avoid the cost of two disk writes, we have the Aeolus FS manager log
its own events and correlate these events with those at the user side compute nodes.
We describe this approach in detail below. Figure 5-4 shows the correlation of events
recorded at the file system server and client side for file read and write operations
described below.
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Figure 5-4: File System Events Correlation. (a) Events generated by two consecutive
reads of the same file. The first read is cached at the client. (b) Events generated
by two consecutive writes to the same file. The two write events at the server are
correlated in the post-collection step.
5.10.1 Client Side
Each file system operation invoked through Aeolus corresponds to two events at the
file system client side (i.e., in the invoking user thread). The first event represents the
file system operation request (e.g., file read request). This event includes information
about the file involved (e.g. the file path name and file labels if the file is being
created) but does not include application level data, such as the content written to or
read from the file. The second event represents the file system reply and includes any
Aeolus-relevant information returned from the file system to the client; for example,
its status indicates whether the operation failed at the server, which could be due
to a violation of information flow control rules. This event has two predecessors: its
P-PRED is the request event and its C-PRED is the event at the file server that the
reply observes.
5.10.2 Server Side
Aeolus FS manager receives concurrent file system requests from its clients. For each
given file, it serializes the requests for this file such that there are no concurrent writes
or concurrent reads and writes (i.e. only concurrent reads are allowed). Therefore,
the Aeolus FS manager observes the exact order of file write operations for each given
file and for each file read operation it knows what write operation preceded it (since
reads and writes do not run concurrently).
The order that the manager observes is reflected in the order of its logged events.
For each client request, the manager logs an event after the execution of this request.
This event has as its predecessor the request event from the client. The manager
then forwards the ID of its server event back to the client where that is set as the
predecessor of the reply event. The client also stores this ID in its cache, so that any
read from the cache has this event as its predecessor. Since operations are serialized
at the server, we can reconstruct the predecessors of each server event in the post-
collection step: for each file operation, we can find the latest update event at the
server stored earlier in the log.
5.11 Use of I/O Devices
Users can write or read from various I/O devices. I/O devices are considered to be
outside of our system. To ensure that sensitive data cannot be leaked outside the
system, writing to an I/O device is only allowed if the security label of the user
thread is null. To ensure that low-integrity data does not influence a high-integrity
user thread, reading from an I/O device is only allowed if the integrity label of the
user thread is null. Both operations correspond to one event record in the log, which
denotes whether the user was reading or writing to a device outside the system. In
the current prototype, we do not include information about the device being accessed;
however, this can be included in the future.
5.11.1 Application Level Event Creation
Applications can include additional events in the audit trail by calling the createEvent
method of the interface to our auditing sub-system. This method creates an event
containing the user-supplied information and sets its P-PRED to the latest event in
this user thread.
Chapter 6
Implementation
In this chapter we describe our audit trail collection and storage strategy, as well
provide more details about what information is actually stored in an event record.
More details on the implementation of the collection data structures can be found in
Appendix B.
6.1 Collection and Storage
6.1.1 Collection
The audit trail collection framework consists of a central logging service responsible
for aggregating event records generated across the entire system and logging clients
responsible for sending local event records to the central service.
As illustrated in Figure 6-1, each platform instance runs a logging client that ships
the event records generated by its user threads' activities to the central logging service
via Java RMI. To optimize performance, event records are sent to the logging service
periodically in batches, instead of sending an event record as soon as it is created.
This strategy may lead to some events being lost if a node fails; we leave the repair
of the audit trail in the presence of failures as something to be dealt with in future
work (see discussion in Chapter 9).
Therefore, event records are stored locally by each platform instance's local log
collector. The log collector accumulates event records based on the ID of the user
thread in which the corresponding user operation ran. When an event record is
created, it is appended to the collection of event records generated by its user thread.
This allows event records generated concurrently by different user threads to be stored
in parallel.
When the records are shipped to the central logging service they are assembled
into a structured collection that maps the user thread ID to a list of its event records.
The event record shipment is scheduled at a fixed time rate, as opposed to shipping
when a given record volume has been reached; the rate is a configuration parameter,
e.g. 1 second. Along with the event records, each shipment also includes the ID of
the sender platform instance and a system timestamp: all the events in this shipment
will be stored with this timestamp to reduce performance overhead of querying the
system clock every time an event occurs.
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Figure 6-1: Audit Trail Collection and Storage Framework
6.1.2 Storage
After arriving at the central logging service, tihe event records are processed and
stored in a logically centralized database. The processing step includes filling in the
timestamp field, as well as the P-PRED if it's missing (the next section explains why
this predecessor is not stored whenever possible). However, this field is easily derivable
since the event records are stored and shipped in the order that they were created by
the user thread; therefore, with some exceptions, the P-PRED is the previous event
in the event record list associated with the given user thread ID.
Storing logs in the database provides more efficiency and flexibility for data pro-
cessing. We store the records in a MySQL relational database and the Neo4j graph
database; the later is good for dependency graph generation [1]. Currently, a database
entry includes all the information stored in an event record, as well as the ID of its
platform instance and user thread.
Archiving and protecting the data in the database is left for future work, as
discussed in Chapter 9.
6.2 Event Records
This section describes our strategy for creating globally unique event IDs and what
event information is excluded from an event record to reduce the logging overhead.
6.2.1 Event IDs
We use a uniform scheme for creating structured unique IDs for the events in our
system. The structure of event IDs provides information about the context of each
event within our system (e.g. the node or platform instance at which the event ran),
which can be used in recovering from partial audit trail data loss (e.g. due to a node
failure) and provides additional user-readibility of audit trail records.
Most recorded events are generated at the invocation of an Aeolus API method in a
user thread of a platform instance running on one of our system nodes. Each platform
instance has a system-wide unique ID (no platform instance will ever run with the
same ID in the system). Within each platform instance, each user computation runs
inside a user thread whose ID is unique relative to the platform instance; however,
user threads can be reused and an event from the same user thread may or may not be
part of the same user computation. To identify events within a user thread, we keep
a counter that is incremented after each recorded event.- To avoid endlessly increasing
this event counter, we reset it every time a user thread is reused and associate instead
an incarnation number with each user thread to reflect how many times it has been
reused.
Therefore, most events can be uniquely identified by the following 4-tuple:
(PI ID, user thread ID, user thread incarnation #, event counter).
However, there are several events in the system that are not recorded inside a user
thread. These are special events recorded at the creation and deletion of a system
node, the launching and shutdown of a platform instance, and the Aeolus FS manager
events. Since each platform instance has a unique ID, we have two special event IDs
for the PI launch and shutdown events, namely:
PI Launch: (PI ID, -, -, 0)
PI Shutdown: (PI ID, -, -, 1).
Furthermore, if we associate the node hostname with the unique ID of its start-up
PI, we obtain the following unique IDs for a node creation and node deletion events:
Node Creation: (hostname, start-up PI ID, -, 0)
Node Deletion: (hostname, start-up PI ID, -, 1).
The file system manager events need to be unique across storage nodes and storage
node relaunches. We differentiate events at different storage nodes by including the
node hostname in the ID. We use an incarnation number for each relaunch of the
file system manager (this is a counter persistently stored in a special file system
configuration file on each node). Finally, the file system manager maintains an event
counter for its events and so the IDs of events logged by the file manager look as
follows:
Aeolus FS manager events: (hostname, incarnation #, -, event counter)
6.2.2 Eliding
We avoid storing information in event records whenever possible in order to reduce
event processing costs and the size of the event records. Since event records are sent
to a central log collector, the size of the record affects the communication overhead.
Primarily, we do not include information that can be deduced from the audit trail
history. For example, we can derive the labels of each user thread event since they
are stored when the thread first starts running and any further label modifications
are recorded in the audit trail. Therefore, it is not necessary to record the return
value of an authority operation, such as a declassify or endorse request. On the other
hand, we do log the return values of all non-deterministic operations, such as the
IDs of newly created principals, tags, closures, and shared state objects, which are
generated randomly. We also record whether an operation succeeded or failed, since
unpredictable non-Aeolus failures are possible.
Due to the way that the event records are collected (as discussed in Section 6.1.1),
we often do not need to store the P-PRED of these events. This information can be
re-derived at the central log collector when the event records are processed after the
shipment.
Finally, we do not record the timestamp in the event records. This reduces the
size of the events and avoids the expensive read of the system clock for each event.
Instead, the timestamp is computed when the PI's logging client sends events to the
central logging service, as described in the Section 6.1.1.
Chapter 7
Auditing Case Studies
In this chapter, we present audit trail records collected during the run of several
sample applications. Our first example is a small application built solely for demon-
strative purposes. It shows uses of the shared state, forks, and remote procedure calls.
Our next example is a simple medical clinic application. It demonstrates uses of au-
thority and persistent data storage via the file system. We present the collected audit
trails as dependency graphs. These graphs were generated using the open source tool
graphviz [7] from the data stored in the log database.
7.1 Demo Application
Our first example is a small distributed client-server application built for demon-
strative purposes only. The application runs on two nodes: the service runs on
26-2-69 .dynamic. csail .mit .edu and the client runs on eigenharp. csail. mit .edu.
Table 7.1 shows the pseudocode of the program executed at the service and the
client and Figure 7-1 shows the graph of event records stored during the run of
this application. The service program registers the RpcTest service with Aeolus,
writes to an I/O device, and waits for clients to connect. The client program runs in
two threads. The starter thread first creates a shared queue, forks a second thread
providing it the handle to the queue, and then waits to dequeue a value from the
shared queue. The forked thread3 places an object in the queue and terminates.
Table 7.1: Demo Client-Service Program
Server - Side
1. RpcTestService service = new RpcTestService()
2. registerService("RpcTest", service)
3. writeToIODevice(screen, "Started service...")
Client - Side
1. handle = createSharedQueue(sLabel=empty, iLabel=empty)
2. AeolusCallable c = new TestCallable(handle)
3. fork(c, p2)
4. value = waitAndDequeue (handle)
5. RpcTest serviceStub = (RpcTest) getServi ce (26-2-69.dynamic.csail.mit.edu,
"edu.mit.csail. aeolus.testing.RpcTest")
6. result = serviceStub.testMethod(value)
7. createEvent("APP-EVENT-RECEIVE-RPC-REPLY", ret-val result)
TestCallable(handle)
1. value = new Integer(5)
2. enqueue(handle, value)
RpcTest Service.test Method(value)
1. writeToIODevice(screen, value)
2. return 1
After it receives the value from the queue, the starter thread obtains a local stub
for the service RpcTest on host 26-2-69.dynamic. csail.mit.edu and invokes the
remote method testMethod. The method runs at the server in a new user thread;
it writes to an I/O device and returns to the client. Finally, since Aeolus does not
log application values such as parameters and results of remote procedure calls, the
client creates an application event to store the value returned by the remote method
invocation.
The IDs of each event in the graph provide information about what platform in-
stance and user thread a given event occurred in. For example, the CREATE-SHARED-
QUEUE event was created in platform instance with ID 7 and user thread with ID
13. Each node also includes the parameters and the return value stored with each
event record. For example, the PI-LAUNCH event parameters specify the ID of the
created platform instance and its root principal ID; the parameter to FORK speci-
fies the principal to run the forked thread with (in this case the principal ID is 3);
the return value of the CREATE-SHARED-QUEUE event stores the handle of the new
shared queue and this handle becomes the parameter of the ENQUEUE and WAIT-AND-
DEQUEUE events (here the handle value is 13); the parameters of the GET-SERVICE
and SEND-RPC events store information about what host the service runs on, the
service name, and the method name for the latter (in this case the hostname is
26-2-69. dynamic. csail. mit . edu, the service is RpcTest, and the method name is
testMethod).
The edges of the graph show the dependencies among the recorded events. We
can see that the WAIT-AND-DEQUEUE event depends both on the previous event in
the same thread (namely, FORK) and on the ENQUEUE event of the forked thread. In
the case of the remote procedure call, we can see that the RECEIVE-RPC event at the
server depends on the SEND-RPC at the client and the RECEIVE-RPC-REPLY event at
the client has the SEND-RPC-REPLY event as its predecessor. The RECEIVE-RPC also
has the REGISTER-SERVICE event of the requested service as its predecessor.
7.2 The Medical Clinic
This section presents the data collected from a simple medical clinic application.
Our clinic has three types of members: the patients seeking treatment at the clinic,
the administrators responsible for registering patients and assigning their doctors,
and the doctors responsible for examining the patients and updating their medical
history. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the pseudocode for the patient registration and the
doctor's patient examination subprograms.
The following steps occur when a new patient, Alice, is registered at the clinic
using the registration program (i.e. via a call to registerPatient(Alice) of Figure
7.2). First, a new principal ID, PAlice, is generated to represent Alice along with
a tag, TAliceMedical, to protect her medical history. A new file is created to store
Alice's medical history data; this file's security and integrity labels include the tag
TAliceMedical. A special principal is then created to represent Alice's current physical,
Table 7.2: Patient Registration by a Clinic Administrator
registerPatient (Patient)
// registration runs with PAdmin
1. PPatient createPrincipal()
2. TPatientMedical = createTagQ
3. createFile( "/patients/PatientRecord", sLabel = TPatientMedical, iLabel = TPatientMedical)
4. PPatientDoctor = createPrincipal()
5. delegate(TPatientMedical , PAdmin, PPatientDoctor)
// assign a doctor to patient
6. actFor(PPatientDoctor, PDoctor)
// update the all-patients file to include this patients's registration info
7. patientInfo = "Patient: PPatient, TPatientMedical, PPatientDoctor"
8. endorse(TAdmin)
9. appendFile( "/patients/AllPatients", patientInfo)
10. removeIntegrity(TAdmin)
PAliceDoctor, and TAliceMedical is delegated to this principal to allow it to review and
update her medical history. Finally, an available physician, Bob, is assigned to treat
Alice; this is achieved by letting Bob's principal, PDoctorBob, act for Alice's physician
(each doctor has his or her own principal ID in the clinic). Note that if Alice switches
to a different doctor, the act-for link between Alice's physician and Bob is revoked.
When registering a patient, the administrator also updates the all-patients file to
store Alice's administrative information, such as the principals PAlice and PAliceDoctor-
Each administrator has its own principal, PAdmin, and all administrators share the
tag, TAdmin, which is stored in the integrity label of the all-patients file, such that
only administrators can update this file (however, doctors can read it).
During Alice's medical exam, her doctor reviews the all-patients file and switches
to PAliceDoctor via a local call operation. PAliceDoctor is authoritative for the tag
TAliceMedical, which the doctor adds to his integrity label in order to update Alice's
medical history. This is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7-2 and 7-3 show the audit trails collected from each subprogram during
the registration of one patient, Alice, and her medical examination by the assigned
physician. We only depict the events generated by the programs in Tables 7.2 and
Table 7.3: Patient Examination by a Doctor
7.3 and do not present the node creation, platform instance, and user thread launch
events; we condense all missing events from the user thread into one event, the LAST-
USER-THREAD-EVENT; the latest authority update at the authority server is denoted
as LATEST-AUTH-UPDATE. Each program runs in single user thread. No other code
executes in the system while these programs are running.
Figure 7-2 shows the results of registering Alice at the clinic. First Alice's principal
and medical tag are created. Each of these operations is an authority update and
corresponds to three events: two events at the client (the request and reply) and
one event at the authority server. The principal and tag IDs are captured by the
return values of the CREATE-PRINCIPAL-REPLY and CREATE-TAG-REPLY and have,
respectively, the values of 3 and 15. The file path of Alice's medical data is captured by
the parameter to the create file operation. As described in Chapter 5, this operation
corresponds to two events at the file client node: the CREATE-FILE request event and
the CREATE-FILE-REPLY event and one event at the file server, FS-CREATE-FILE. The
labels of the created file are also stored in the event parameters; they include Alice's
medical tag, 15. Next, we see the creation of Alice's doctor principal; its ID is 4,
as indicated by the return value of the reply event. Alice's medical tag, with ID 15,
is then delegated to Alice's doctor principal. The assignment of a doctor to Alice is
examinePatient (Patient)
// examination runs with PDoctor
7/ doctor first reads the patient registration data for patName
1. (TPatientMedical, PPatientDoctor) = readFile("/patients/AllPatients")
2. AeolusCallable c = new AeolusCallableO {
3. addSe cre cy(TPatientMedical)
4. patientHistory = readFile("/patients/PatientRecord")
5. newHistory = "The examination revealed... Recommended treatment...."
6. endorse(TPatientMedical)
7. appendFi le ( "/patients/PatientRecord", newHistory)
8. removeIntegrity(TPatientMedical)
9. declassif y(TPatientMedical) }
10. call(c, PPatientDoctor")
captured by the ACT-FOR event, which creates an act-for link between the doctor with
principal ID 2 and Alice's doctor principal with ID 4. Finally, the administrator adds
the administrator tag (with ID 10) to his integrity label to update the all-patients
file.
After Alice is registered, she is seen by her doctor who runs the patient exami-
nation program. The audit trail events are depicted in Figure 7-3. The doctor first
reads the all-patient file and then makes a call operation to switch to Alice's doctor
principal (with ID 4 depicted in the parameters to CALL). During the execution of
the call, the doctor reads and updates Alice's medical file. He adds Alice's medical
tag with ID 15 do his secrecy and integrity label to perform these operations (as de-
picted by the ADD-SECRECY and ENDORSE events). The ENDORSE event, as well as
the CALL, REMOVE-INTEGRITY, and DECLASSIFY events, is an authority lookup and
has the latest authority update event of the authority client as its C-PRED. Finally
the return from the call is represented by the CALL-RETURN event.
Figure 7-1: Audit Trail Generated By the Client-Service Demo Application
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Figure 7-2: Audit Trail Generated By the Patient Registration Program
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Figure 7-3: Audit Trail Generated By the Doctor Examination Program
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Chapter 8
Performance Evaluation
Aeolus audit trails monitor all user activity in the system and provide means to
reconstruct the chain of events leading to a given system state, by recording every
user call to the Aeolus API (as well as occasional system events) and maintaining
links between the recorded events. This poses additional overhead in serving Aeolus
API calls. In this chapter we examine the performance characteristics of collecting
and storing the audit trail content. We present a series of micro-benchmarks to
evaluate the logging overhead on each individual operation type. We also include
results from several macro-benchmarks that examine the overall impact of logging on
system performance.
8.1 Experimental Setup
All experiments described in this chapter were performed on identical machines run-
ning Ubuntu 9.10 with OpenJDK Java version 1.6.0_0 and Eclipse 3.5.1 installed.
Each system has 2.83 Ghz Intel Q9550 quad core processors and 4GB of RAM. The
machines were connected via a 100Mbps switch with the network roundtrip time of
less than 1 millisecond. In order to measure steady-state performance, Java rec-
ommended micro-benchmarking practices [16, 4] were followed. In particular, all
experiments included a warmup phase intended to trigger all initializations and com-
pilations. We ensured that no code path was taken for the first time during the timing
phase to avoid deoptimization and recompilation effects. In order to avoid dead-code
elimination, we also ensured that the results computed by the benchmark were some-
how used (otherwise the compiler can eliminate the computation if it determines that
the computation cannot affect the output). In order to avoid full garbage collection
to take place during the timing phase, we clean up the JVM before each bench-
mark (using System.gc() and ensure that sufficient memory is available (the JVM
-Xmx parameter was set to 2GB during the runs). The -XX: +PrintCompilation and
-verbose: gc parameters were set during the runs to ensure that the compiler and
the garbage collector are not performing unexpected tasks during the timing phase.
The -XX:CICompilerCount=1 argument was also used to prevent the compiler from
running in parallel with itself. In order to avoid CPU caching effects, tests were run
with varying sizes of the data set, whenever appropriate. Each benchmark was run
multiple times, always in a separate JVM. The number of iterations was set such that
the total time exceeds a couple of seconds whenever possible (most average values
were computed over 100,000 runs). Finally, noise was reduced as much as possible
during the measurements.
8.2 General Costs
Since all user interactions with Aeolus are monitored, there is a generic cost of creating
and storing an event record associated with every call to the Aeolus API. Although
event records vary in size (e.g., due to the number and size of the user-supplied pa-
rameters), there is a common cost associated with storing the record in local memory,
shipping it to the server, and finally storing it in the database. On the other hand,
the cost of capturing and storing event predecessors varies significantly among differ-
ent types of Aeolus API calls. For example, we maintain additional information for
each shared state object in order to track its update history and we create special
log entries at the file server so that we can capture the order of file system events.
The micro-benchmarks presented next describe the costs associated with logging each
individual operation type. In order to maximize the logging overhead, we try to mini-
mize the execution time of each operation; for example, we supply small-sized objects
to shared state operations and use null labels whenever appropriate.
8.3 Local Forks and Calls
8.3.1 Forks
Aeolus provides the Fork method, which allows programmers to fork a new user thread
running some provided code with a given principal. An event record is created by
the Fork method before the new user thread starts executing and an additional event
record is registered at the new user thread launch. In addition, in order to correlate
the events in the parent and child threads, the ID of the fork event is carried over to
the child process where it becomes the predecessor of its first event (namely, the user
thread launch event). Table 8.1 shows the average request time for executing Fork
requests with and without logging. This time includes the allocation of an unused user
thread and the execution of the code inside that thread. The code simply outputs
a character to the screen. Since the processing of a fork request itself is on the
order of several microseconds, the experiment measures the total time of executing
1000 consecutive fork requests and then computes their average. Therefore, a small
overhead is added due to the synchronization of the parent and child thread; namely,
the parent thread needs to be notified that the child has finished in order to fork the
consecutive thread (this is achieved through the use of a static variable).
Since any user process can switch to the public principal, Ppcblic, running fork
with this principal is less expensive - the switch is authorized without consulting
the authority client. Similarly, any principal can fork with the its own pid. When
requesting to run with a different principal, a request to check the authority of the
caller process is sent to the authority client, whose reply carries both the return value
of the authority lookup, as well as the ID of its preceding authority update event,
which creates some additional overhead in performing the authority check.
We found that the logging overhead of the Fork operation is statistically insignif-
icant.
Table 8.1: Average Request Time (ms) of Fork
Operation Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
Fork to pid 0.028 0.03
Fork to Ppublic 0.023 0.024
8.3.2 Calls
Programmers can also run code with different authority in the same user process
using the Call method. Two event records are created for this operation - before
and after the code invocation. Similarly to the Fork call, switching to a non-public
principal requires an additional authority lookup that carries logging information
from the authority client. In the case of the Call operation, however, the event ID
of the predecessor of the first event in the invoked code can be easily accessed (since
the method is invoked in the same user domain). Table 8.2 presents the average of
performing a Call operation with and without logging. The executed code simply
prints a character to the screen. Averages were computed over 10,000 runs. Similarly
to the Fork operation the switch to a public principal is always authorized and requires
less processing time. As with the Fork operation, the logging overhead is very small
(less than 10 microseconds per call).
Table 8.2: Average Request Time (ms) of a Call
Operation Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
Call to pid 0.02 0.028
Call to Ppublic 0.017 0.028
8.4 Remote Procedure Calls
Users can invoke methods on remote services registered with Aeolus by retrieving a
service proxy from Aeolus at the client side - this proxy serves as a local reference
to the remote service object. A method invocation on this proxy triggers Aeolus to
send an RPC request from the client node to the node hosting the service. In order
to correlate the events at the client and server side, both the RPC request and reply
carry predecessor event IDs. Two events are recorded at the client side: when sending
the RPC request and upon the receipt of the reply. Respectively, two events are also
recorded at the server side: upon the receipt of the RPC request and when sending
the RPC reply. In addition, some logging state is maintained at each node service
registry to correlate the registering and access of user services.
For this benchmark, we created a service that simply maintains an integer counter.
A client can invoke increment (value) to increase the counter by the specified amount.
Our experiment consisted of a client and a server running on two separate machines.
Table 8.3 shows the average round-trip latency of the increment method call with
and without logging. Logging adds a small overhead of roughly 80 microseconds per
one RPC. The presented values were averaged over 1000 invocations (each call simply
incremented the counter by 1). We expect the costs of an Aeolus RPC operation to
be higher in our final implementation; however, this cost increase is not related to
the logging costs and would only make the logging overhead comparatively smaller.
Table 8.3: Average Round-Trip Latency (ms) of a Basic RPC
Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
2.37 2.455
8.5 Shared State
The shared state provides a way for user processes of the same platform instance
to exchange information and synchronize. Every shared state operation corresponds
to one event record. There are three ways of communicating via the shared state:
through the use of shared objects, shared queues, and shared locks. In order to
correlate access and modifier events of these objects, additional state is maintained
at each object to capture its latest modification event. Therefore, calls that modify
the shared state objects also carry the IDs of the modifier events and each reply from
the shared state manager carries the ID of the predecessor event.
8.5.1 Shared Objects
Every update of the shared object content needs to modify the associated field stor-
ing the latest modifier event ID. Every read of the file content also reads this field.
Since access to shared objects is synchronized through the use of read-write locks, no
additional synchronization is necessary to maintain this field.
Table 8.4 shows the cost of basic operations on a shared object that contains an
integer and no labels with and without logging. These values were averaged over
100,000 iterations. In all cases, the logging overhead is very small (on the order of a
microsecond).
Table 8.4: Average Request Time (ms) of Basic Operations on Shared Object
Shared Object Operation Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
CreateObject 0.0134 0.0141
GetObject 0.0116 0.0124
ReplaceObject 0.0113 0.0118
8.5.2 Shared Queues
The enqueue and dequeue operations are also synchronized, which removes the need
of synchronizing the update of the last queue modifier event. However, each queue
entry needs to store the ID of its enqueue event.
Table 8.5 shows the cost of basic operations on a shared queue with no labels that
contains integer-size objects with and without logging. These values were averaged
over 100,000 iterations. In all cases, the logging overhead is very small (on the order
of a microsecond).
Table 8.5: Average Request Time (ms) of Basic Operations on Shared Queue
8.5.3 Shared Locks
Each lock also has an associated last-modified field which is updated when a lock
is acquired or released. Since lock acquire and release operations serialize lock state
modifications, there is no need for additional synchronization.
Table 8.5 shows the cost of basic operations on a shared queue with no labels that
contains integer-size objects with and without logging. These values were averaged
over 100,000 iterations. In all cases, the logging overhead is very small (less than a
microsecond).
Table 8.6: Average Request Time (ms) of Basic Operations on Shared Lock
Shared Lock Operation Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
Lock 0.00047 0.00085
TryLock 0.00046 0.00084
Unlock 0.00046 0.00083
8.6 Authority State
Users interact with the authority state via authority update and lookup operations.
8.6.1 Authority Lookups
Authority lookups are processed at the local authority client and do not pass any
additional information to the client since they are not reflected in the authority state
modifier chain. As part of its reply, the authority client includes the ID of the latest
authority update event that becomes the predecessor of the given lookup event. Table
8.7 shows the average time of a successful Declassif y (t) operation with and without
logging. A call to Declassify includes an authority lookup operation, which checks
if the user process is authorized to remove the given tag t from its secrecy label. This
Declassify succeeds and required information is in the authority client cache during
the measurement. The benchmark first creates the tag so that the predecessor ID
passed back when logging is turned on is not null (this ID will be the ID of the tag
creation event). The average was computed over 100,000 runs. The logging overhead
is very small (less than a microsecond).
Table 8.7: Average Request Time (ms) of an Authority Lookup Operation
Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
0.00057 0.00076
8.6.2 Authority Updates
An authority update corresponds to two recorded events at the client (the request
and the reply). The ID of the authority update request event needs to be carried to
the authority server. The authority server logs an additional event. The ID of this
event is stored in the database together with other information associated with this
update event. This ID is also included as part of the server's reply back to the client.
Table 8.8 includes the average value of a createPrincipal operation computed over
1000 iterations. The network roundtrip time was found to be under 1 millisecond.
Table 8.8: Average Request Time (ms) of an Authority Update Operation
Operation Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
createPrincipal (total) 1.692 1.714
8.7 File System
The Aeolus FS manager runs on Aeolus storage nodes and manages the data stored in
the underlying file system. Namely, it checks that all the incoming file system requests
are authorized by verifying the file secrecy and integrity labels. The manager serializes
all the operations on the same file, such that there are no concurrent writes to the file
or concurrent reads and writes (only file reads can run concurrently). For each file
operation it executes, the manager creates an audit trail event record that captures
the information about the executed operation. It sends the ID of this event back to
the client.
At the file system client node, each file system operation corresponds to two event
records: one representing the file operation request and one the reply. The ID of the
request event is forwarded to the server, where it becomes the predecessor of the sever
logged event. The server event ID is sent back to the client, where it becomes the
predecessor of the reply event. The client caches the file read operations. This cache
includes the content of the file, as well as the ID of its read event at the file server.
If the information is found in the cache, this ID is set as the predecessor of the file
read reply event.
The number of created events and the way they are correlated is the same for
all file operations except for cached file reads. Our experiment measures the logging
overhead on file writes and cached file reads. The client and the server are located on
two separate machines. Table A.18 shows the average value of a file read operation
on a 5KB file when the file content is found in the cache and the average value of a
file write operation (5KB of data are written to the file in each call). The averages
were computed over 1000 iterations. The cached file read operation is very fast and
the logging overhead is very small (under 1 microsecond). The logging overhead on
the file write operation is also small (around 15 microseconds).
Table 8.9: Average Request Time (ms) of Basic File Operations
File Operation Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging
Read (cached) 0.00022 0.00084
Write (server) 0.4801 0.4957
8.8 End-to-End Evaluations
8.8.1 Medical Clinic
We implemented a simple medical clinic application to examine the overall logging
overhead on a common application pattern involving authority updates and frequent
access to the file system. A detailed description of this application can be found
in Chapter 7. In this experiment we have an administrator principal that registers
several patients and assigns them to a doctor and one doctor that later examines and
updates all the patient files. In total, 1000 patients are first registered and assigned
to a doctor and all their medical records are then examined and modified by their
assigned doctor (for simplicity the clinic only has one doctor). The patient medical
records are small files of 10KB. We only measure the time it takes one doctor to view
and update all patient files. Each file update overwrites the entire file so that the
patient files always remain the same size. Table 8.10 includes the average time it
takes the application to run with and without logging on 1000 patient files. We found
that logging created roughly 9% overhead.
Table 8.10: Average Runtime (s) of the Medical Clinic service
Aeolus Aeolus w/ Logging Overhead Factor
1.010 1.100 1.08
Chapter 9
Conclusions
This thesis has presented the design and implementation of audit trail collection for
Aeolus, a distributed security platform based on information flow control. Aeolus
audit trails are event logs that monitor the interaction of user application code with
the Aeolus platform. In addition they can include application level events recorded
using the provided user interface to the auditing framework.
Event records are collected on each system node and shipped to a centralized
location, where they are stored in a database and processed. We correlate events
by capturing any dependencies between them in the audit trail records. Each au-
dit trail record stores links to its immediate predecessor events; this is achieved by
uniquely identifying each event in the system. Audit trail records form event depen-
dency graphs, where the nodes are the events and the edges represent the causality
relationship between them captured by the predecessor links. From this information,
we can easily reconstruct event chains by following the event predecessor links. For
example, we can find all the events that could have led to a given system state.
A new prototype of the Aeolus platform has been developed in Java and includes
the auditing collection framework. Our results show that logging imposes a small
overhead on system performance.
This work has focused on the content, format, and the collection and storage
mechanism of the audit trails. Subsequent work will mostly focus on the analysis and
management of the collected data. We now discuss future project directions.
" Protection. We want to ensure that only authorized parties can get access to
the data stored in the audit trail database and that no erroneous data can be
added to the database. This can be achieved using information flow control to
protect the database.
* Archiving. Events that occurred long in the past need to be moved from the
working database to an archive. We need a criteria for determining when events
can be removed; the archive files also need to be protected.
* Reliability. We need to replicate the central audit trail storage node to ensure
that audit trail information will not be lost if this node fails.
* Recovery. Since audit trails are shipped to the central storage only periodically,
some event records can be lost due to a node failure. We need to develop a
strategy for recovering from this loss. First, we need a way of determining
when missing events are permanently lost. If a loss is detected, we need to
reconstruct the chains of events that have been broken. Event IDs will be useful
for recovering some missing information. For example, they include enough
information to discover the latest event of a user thread that has not been lost;
they can also identify how many events are missing from some given user thread
execution based on the value of the event counter.
* Graphical User Interface. We need to find ways to present the event dependency
graphs to the users. These graphs can be very large; therefore, the interface
needs to provide some way of focusing on some chosen events, while representing
others in a condensed way. The interface should also handle node rearrangement
and deletion.
" Filtering. We need to develop a graph algorithm for filtering out event records
based on some criteria. If an event record needs to be removed (e.g. because
it does not match the criteria of interest), its predecessor chains need to be
changed appropriately (i.e. if event E is being removed and it's a predecessor of
an event A, then Pred(A) needs to be set to Pred(A)-E+Pred(E)). Since the
event dependency graphs can be very large, the algorithm could be parallelized
to explore nodes concurrently.
" Querying. We need to understand what kind of queries are useful for analyzing
the audit trail records and provide efficient algorithms for running them and
representing their results. Additional data might be stored in the database
event record entries to improve performance. For example, if a common query
is to find all the events created by a given principal, we might want to store the
principal ID associated with each event in the event database entry (currently
the principal ID is only stored in the user thread launch event of a fork, a local
call, and an authority closure call).
" Detection. We might want to provide tools to help detect anomalies in the audit
trails. There are various attack signature-detection tools that look for a specific
sequence of events that signals a security violation. We can provide a similar
tool that would match a given chain of events to the events stored in the audit
trails. We need to understand what patterns are relevant to our system.
" Backtracking. Audit trails maintain a history of system event execution and
if a security violation is detected, we could use this information to backtrack
to a valid system state. For example, we could store periodic snapshots of the
authority state and replay authority updates from a given valid snapshot.
Appendix A
Audit Trail Events
This appendix describes what events are recorded for each Aeolus operation and what
information they store. We do not include context-dependent information, such as
the timestamp and success/failure status. Only normal case behavior is explained.
The P-PRED is assumed, unless explicitly included.
Table A.1: Principals
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-REQUEST
pid createPrincipal() e2. CREATE-PRINCIPAL (at server):
preds={el,last-auth-server-update},
parms={caller-pid}, ret-val={pid}
e3. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-REPLY:
preds={ el, e2}, ret-val={pid}
el. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-NEWCORE-REQUEST:
e2. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-NEWCORE (at server):
preds={el,last-auth-server-update},
parms={caller-pid}, ret-val={ pid }
e3. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-NEWCORE-REPLY:
preds={e1, e2}, ret-val={pid}
el. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-INCORE-REQUEST:
parms={pidl}
pid2 createPrincipalInCore (pid1) e2. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-INCORE (at server):
preds={el,last-auth-server-update},
parms={caller-pid, pid1}, ret-val={pid2}
e3. CREATE-PRINCIPAL-INCORE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={pid2}
Table A.2: Tags
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-TAG-REQUEST:
tid createTag() e2. CREATE-TAG (at server):
preds={el, last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-pid},
ret-val={tid}
e3. CREATE-TAG-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={tid}
el. CREATE-SUBTAG-REQUEST:
parms={tid1}
tid2 createSubTag(tidl) e2. CREATE-SUBTAG (at server):
preds={el, last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-pid,
tidl}, ret-val={ tid2 }
e3. CREATE-SUBTAG-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={tid2}
Table A.3: Delegations and Revocations
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. ACT-FOR-REQUEST:
actFor(pl, p2 ) parms={ pl, p2 }
e2. ACT-FOR (at server):
preds={el, last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-pid,
pl, p2}
e3. ACT-FOR-REPLY:
preds={ el, e2}
el. REVOKE-ACT-FOR-REQUEST:
revokeActFor(pl, p2) parms={pl, p2}
e2. REVOKE-ACT-FOR (at server):
preds={el, last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-pid,
p1, p2}
e3. REVOKE-ACT-FOR-REPLY:
preds=f{el, e2}
el. DELEGATE-REQUEST:
delegate(t, p1, p2) parms = {t, pl, p2}
e2. DELEGATE (at server):
preds={el, last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-pid,
t, p1, p2}
e3. DELEGATE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}
el. REVOKE-DELEGATE-REQUEST:
revokeDelegate(t, p1, p2) parms={t, p1, p2}
e2. REVOKE-DELEGATE (at server):
preds={el, last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-pid,
t, p1, p2}
e3. REVOKE-DELEGATE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}
Table A.4: Label Manipulations
Aeolus API Method Event Records
addSecrecy(t) el. ADD-SECRECY:
parms={t}
removeIntegrity(t) el. REMOVE-INTEGRITY:
parms={t}
declassify(t) el. DECLASSIFY:
preds={last-auth-client-update}, parms= {t}
endorse(t) el. ENDORSE:
preds={last-auth-client-update}, parms={t}
Table A.5: Authority Closures
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-CLOSURE-REQUEST:
cid createClosure (class) parms={class.Name}
e2. CREATE-CLOSURE (at server):
preds = {el ,last-auth-server-update}, parms={caller-
pid, class.Name}, ret-val={cid}
e3. CREATE-CLOSURE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={cid}
closureObj getClosure(cid) el. GET-CLOSURE:
closure_ bjgetlosure_(cid) preds={last-auth-client-update}, parms={cid}
el. CALL-CLOSURE:
callClosure(cid, closureObj) preds= {last-auth-client-update}, parms={cid, c.pid}
e2. CALL-CLOSURE-RETURN
preds={last-event-of-closure-invocation}
Table A.6: Boxes
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-BOX:
b createBox(outerSLabel, outerlLabel, parms={outerSLabel, outerILabel, inner-SLabel, innerILabel}
innerSLabel, innerILabel)
el. GET-INNER-SLABEL:
b.getInnerSLabel() preds={b.CREATE-BOX}
el. GET-INNER-ILABEL:
b.getInnerILabel() preds={b.CREATE-BOX}
el. GET-OUTER-SLABEL:
b.getOuterSLabel() preds={b.CREATE-BOX}
el. GET-OUTER-ILABEL:
b. getOuterILabel () preds={b.CREATE-BOX}
obj b .getContent ()el. GET-BOX-CONTENT:preds={b. last-PUT-BOX-CONTENT/
b.CREATE-BOX}
b. putContent (obj) el. PUT-BOX-CONTENT:
preds={b. last-PUT-BOX-CONTENT/
b.CREATE-BOX)
Table A.7: Shared State: Shared Objects
Aeolus API Method Event Records
obj getSharedRoot ( el. GET-SHARED-ROOT
preds={last-UPDATE-SHARED-ROOT}
updat eSharedRoot (obj) el. UPDATE-SHARED-ROOT
preds={last-UPDATE-SHARED-ROOT}
objID createSharedfbject(sLabel, el. CREATE-SHARED-OBJECT:
' parms={sLabel, iLabel}, ret-val={objID}
iLabel, obj)
obj getSharedObject (obj ID) el. GET-SHARED-OBJECT:
preds=f{obj.last-UPDATE-SHARED-OBJECT),
parms= {objID}
updateSharedObj ect (obj ID, obj) el. UPDATE-SHARED-OBJECT:
preds={obj.laSt-UPDATE-SHARED-OBJECT},
parms=f{objI D}
deleteSharedObj ect (obj ID) el. DELETE-SHARED-OBJECT:
preds={obj. last-UPDATE-SHARED-OBJECT},
parms={objID}
Table A.8: Shared State: Shared Queues
Aeolus API Method Event Records
qID createSharedQueue(sLabel, iLabel) el. CREATE-SHARED-QUEUE:
parms={sLabel, iLabel}, ret-val={qID}
el. ENQUEUE:
enqueue (qID, obj) preds=f{q.last-ENQUEUE/DEQUEUE),
parms={qID}
el. DEQUEUE:
obj dequeue(qID) preds=f{obj.ENQUEUE}, parms={qID}
el. WAIT-AND-DEQUEUE:
obj waitAndDequeue (qID) preds={obj.ENQUEUE}, parms={qID}
el. DELETE-SHARED-QUEUE:
deleteSharedQueue (qID) preds={q.lat-ENQUEUE/DEQUEUE),
parms = {qID}
Table A.9: Shared State: Shared Locks
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-SHARED-LOCK:
lockID createSharedLock(sLabel, iLabel) parms={sLabel,iLabel}, ret-
val={lockID}
el. LOCK:
lock(lockID) preds={lock. last-UNLOCK/ CREATE-
SHARED-LOCK}, parms={lockID}
el. TRY-LOCK:
bool trylock(lockID) preds={lock.last-UNLOCK/CREATE-
SHARED-LOCK}, parms={lockID},
ret-val={bool}
el. UNLOCK:
unlock(lockID) preds={lock. last-LOCK},
parms={lockID}
el. DELETE-SHARED-LOCK:
deleteSharedLock(lockID) preds={lock.last-LOCK/UNLOCK/
CREATE-SHARED-LOCK},
parms={lockID}
Table A. 10: File System: Files
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-FILE-REQUEST:
parms={hostname, filePath, sLabel, iL-bool createFile(hostname, filePath, ael} snae ie~tsabl L
abel}
sLabel, iLabel) e2. FS-CREATE-FILE (at server):
preds={el ,last-parentdir-update}
parms={filePath, sLabel, iLabel}
e3. CREATE-FILE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={bool}
el. READ-FILE-REQUEST:
content readFile(hostnaine, filePath) parms={hostname, filePath}
e2.if(cache-miss):FS-READ-FILE(at server):
preds={el ,file. last-write},
parms= {filePath}
e3. READ-FILE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2/cache.file.fs-read}
el. WRITE-FILE-REQUEST:
parms={ hostname, filePath}writeFile(hostname, filePath, content) p2rmS-{hoteFILEath}
e2. FS-WRITE-FILE (at server):
preds={el ,file.last-write},
parms= {filePath}
e3. WRITE-FILE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}
el. DELETE-FILE-REQUEST:
bool deleteFile(hostname, filePath) parms=fhostname, filePath}
e2. FS-DELETE-FILE (at server):
preds={el, file. last-write, last-parentdir-
update}, parms={filePath}
e3. DELETE-FILE-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={bool}
Table A.11: File System: Directories
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-DIR-REQUEST:
bool createDir(hostname, filePath, parms={hostname, filePath, sLabel, iLabel}
sLabel, iLabel) e2. FS-CREATE-DIR (at server):
preds={el, last-parentdir-update}
e3. CREATE-DIR-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={bool}
el. LIST-DIR-REQUEST:
content listDir(hostname, filePath) parms {hostname, filePath}
e2. FS-LIST-DIR (at server):
preds={el, last-dir-update}
e3. LIST-DIR-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}
el. DELETE-DIR-REQUEST:
bool deleteDir(hostname, filePath) parms = {hostname, filePath}
e2. FS-DELETE-DIR (at server):
preds={el, last-dir-update, last-parentdir-
update}
e3. DELETE-DIR-REPLY:
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={bool}
Table A.12: File System: File Streams
Aeolus API Method
handle openFilestream(hostname, filePath,
mode)
Event Records
el .OPEN-FILESTREAM-REQUEST:
parms={hostname, filePath, mode}
e2.if(mode=READ&cache-miss)
FS-READ-FILE(at server):
preds={el,file.last-write},
parms={filePath}
if(mode=READ&cache-hit)
cache.file.fs-read
if(mode=WRITE) no-event
e3. OPEN-FILESTREAM-REPLY
preds={el, e2}, ret-val={handle}
content readFilestream(handle, el.READ-FILESTREAM:
offset, count) preds={cache.file.fs-read},
parms={handle}
writeFilestream(handle, content, el.WRITE-FILESTREAM:
offset, count) parms=f{handle}
el .CLOSE-FILESTREAM-REQUEST:
closeFilestream(handle) prs{adeparms={ handle}
if(mode=WRITE) e2. FS-WRITE-
FILE (at server):
preds={el,file.last-write},
parms={filePath}
e3. CLOSE-FILESTREAM-REPLY
preds={el, e2}
Table A.13: Service Registry and Remote Procedure Calls
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. REGISTER-SERVICE:
registerService(serviceName, className) parms={serviceName}
serviceStub getService(hostnaine, serviceName) el. GET-SERVICE:
parms= {hostname, serviceName}
el. SEND-RPC (at client):
result serviceStub.remoteMethod(params) preds=last-auth-client-
update}, parms={hostname,
serviceStub.serviceName,
remoteMethod.Name}
e2. RECEIVE-RPC (at server):
predsz={el, service.registration,
last-auth-client-update}, parms
= {serviceName, methodName,
sLabel, iLabel}
e3. SEND-RPC-REPLY:
preds={last-event-in-method-
invocation, last-auth-client-
update}
e4. RECEIVE-RPC-REPLY:
preds={el, e3, last-auth-client-
update}
Table A.14: Local Calls and Forks
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. FORK: (in parent thread)
. cpreds={last-auth-client-update}, parms={pid}
e2. USER-THREAD-LAUNCH (in child thread):
preds={el}, parms={pid}
el. CALL:
call(pid, code) preds={last-auth-client-update}, parms={pid}
e2. CALL-RETURN:
preds= {last-event-in-code-execution}
Table A.15: Node Creation / Deletion
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. CREATE-NODE (at auth-server):
start-up(appName, appArgs, isDataNode) preds{ast-auth-server-update},parms= {hostname}, ret-
val={nodeRootPid}
e2. CREATE-NODE:
preds={el}, parms={hostname, node-
RootPid, isDataNode}
e3. LAUNCH-PI:
(this is not part of the API) preds={e2},parms={piID, nodeRootPid,
appName}
e4. LAUNCH-USER-THREAD:
preds={e3}, parms={nodeRootPid}
el. DELETE-NODE-REQUEST:
deleteNode(hostname) parms={hostname}
e2. DELETE-NODE (at auth-server):
preds = {el},parms={hostname}
e3. DELETE-NODE-REPLY:
preds = {el, e2}
Table A.16: Platform Instance Launch / Shutdown
Aeolus API Method Event Records
el. PI-LAUNCH-REQUEST:
preds={last-auth-client-update},
parms={hostname, piPid, appName}
e2. LAUNCH-PI (at hostname):
preds={el,pi.node.creation},
parms={piID, piPid, appName}
e3. LAUNCH-USER-THREAD (at host-
name):
preds={e2}, parms={pid=piPid}
e4. LAUNCH-PI-RETURN (at hostname):
preds= {last-event-in-app-thread}
e5. LAUNCH-PI-REPLY:
preds={el, e4}
el. PI-SHUTDOWN-REQUEST:
shutdownPlatformInstance (hostname, piID) parms={hostname, piID}
e2. SHUTDOWN-PI (at hostname):
preds = {el, last-auth-client-update},
parms={caller-pid, piID}
e3. SHUTDOWN-PI-RETURN (at host-
name):
e4. SHUTDOWN-PI-REPLY:
preds = {el, e4}
Table A.17: Auditing Interface
Aeolus API Method Event Records
eid createEvent(preds, event-name, parms, el. event-name:
status, ret-val, timestamp) event info as specified by the arguments
Table A.18: I/O Devices
launchPlatformInstance(hostname, piPid,
appName, appArgs)
Type of I/O Event Event Records
read el. READ-FROM-LO-DEVICE:
parms={device-type}
write el. WRITE-TO-IO-DEVICE:
parms={device-type}
Appendix B
Implementation Details: Audit
Trail Collection and Shipment
Structures
This appendix includes a detailed description of the data structures used to collect
and ship audit trail data in our current prototype.
B.O.2 Local In-Memory Collection
An Aeolus event is captured by an EventRecord object, whose fields store the infor-
mation associated with the event (the event ID, event predecessors, operation name,
parameters, return value, timestamp, and the status). EventRecords are submitted
to the platform instance Collector for storage. The Collector is responsible for
aggregating EventRecords from all user threads of this platform instance. Since user
threads run concurrently, we need to guarantee that submitting EventRecords to the
Collector is a thread-safe routine. Moreover, since the record data is forwarded
periodically to a central server, we also need to synchronize this routine with the
removal of the records that have already been shipped. In order to guarantee the
thread-safety of these operations without a significant synchronization overhead, we
use a specialized concurrent data structure, called SynchronizedEventsTable, to
store all the records submitted to the Collector.
The SynchronizedEventsTable maps user thread IDs to the list of EventRecords
generated in these threads. Internally, it relies on Java's
ConcurrentHashMap collection provided by the java. util .concurrent package, which
is an efficient and scalable thread-safe implementation of Map that does not use table-
wide locking and is optimized for retrieval operations (read operations almost always
run concurrently). Since user threads are reused by the platform instance, there is
no need to remove any entries from our map - once an event record was submitted to
the Collector from a user thread, the table will always have an entry for this thread
ID; therefore, write operations will be very rare, occurring only upon the addition
of a new user thread ID to the table. Iterating over map elements is also tread-safe;
however, insertions or deletions occurring after the creation of the Iterator may or
may not be included (as specified by the Java documentation).
Our SynchronizedEventsTable provides two operations: addEvent and
getAllAndReset. The addEvent operation adds a new event record to the table
based on the ID of the calling user thread: if the ID is already in the table, the
event is just appended to the list of events associated with this ID; otherwise, a new
table entry is created for this user thread. The getAllAndReset operation runs when
the event records are being shipped to the central server. It returns all the event
records currently stored in the table. In order to retrieve the content of the table, the
procedure iterates over all the table entries, assembling the current event lists into
a separate collection, while resetting map's events list references to new empty lists
(the value of each map entry is actually a special object that holds a reference to the
events list). Even though there might be recent additions to the table that were not
returned by the map iterator, these will be captured the next time this procedure
runs. Both addEvent and getAllAndReset are read operations with respect to the
events table, since they only modify the value of the event list referenced from the
table entry (either by appending to the existing list or resetting the value to a new
list). As already mentioned these operations are optimized by the underlying Java
collection and usually require no locking.
Since user threads are single threads, only one addEvent operation at a time can
run on the same event list and so, we have no race conditions when it comes to
appending events to the list. However, the getAllAndReset operation can process
a table entry concurrently with the addEvent operation on that entry's event list.
In order to avoid this race condition, we associate a lock with each table entry to
synchronize the access to its event list reference. The getAllAndReset operation will
lock each entry at a time as it iterates over the table. This lock will only be held
briefly since the procedure only resets the list reference to a new list. The addEvent
operation will also need to grab this lock when appending to the list; however, the
contention on this lock will be low since getAllAndReset only runs periodically when
the the data is shipped to the server.
B.O.3 Shipment to a Centralized Location
Audit trail data collected locally by each platform instance is periodically sent to a
centralized location for persistent storage and processing. Each platform instance runs
a LoggingClient, which sends the audit trail data to the central LoggingService
via Java RMI. When the shipment event happens, the Collector passes all the
accumulated EventRecords to the LoggingClient. Scheduling the log shipment is
implemented as a recurring task using Java's ScheduledThreadPoolExecutor class.
This thread pool accepts Runnable task objects and can execute them at a fixed time
rate with any specified delays using one of its available worker threads. This pool is
managed by the platform instance.
In order to facilitate the processing of the received data at the server and reduce
the amount of information being sent, all event records are aggregated into a struc-
tured form. In our current implementation the records are sent as a Java HashMap
object, which maps the ID of the user thread to a list of its event records (similar to
the form in which the data is locally stored). We rely on Java Serialization to send
this map across the network (we also provide an XML alternative for assembling and
parsing this data). Along with the event records, each data shipment also includes
the ID of the sender platform instance and a system timestamp - all the events in
this shipment will be actually stored with this approximate timestamp to reduce the
performance overhead of querying the system clock every time an event occurs.
In our current implementation, the central LoggingService runs at one system
node. For example, it could be co-located with the authority server.
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